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PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES ON VESSELS REGULARLY
ENGAGED IN EINTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE
JoHN AmBLER

The subjection of vessels regularly engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce to personal property taxes will become increasingly important
after the present war. The overwhelming majority of vessels capable
of being so engaged are now owned by the United States of America and
so are not presently subject to the personal property taxes of the various
states. It is believed that this situation will be reversed after the
present war and the greatly augmented Merchant Marine of the
United States will be largely owned and operated by private parties.
The imposition of personal property taxes upon vessels regularly engaged in interstate or foreign commerce presents two rather peculiar
problems not often otherwise involved:
(1) Where are vessels so engaged taxable?
(2) How much should vessels so engaged be taxed?
The solution of the first problem requires the application of legal
principles to the factual situation presented in the particular case. The
general principles are fairly well established. The.solution of the second problem requires a consideration of some legal principles, but more
directly involves the policy of the taxing state. 'The: exercise of the
taxing power of a particuar state must necessarily be tempered somewhat by the fact that the vessel owner may often avoid excessive taxation by simply moving its domicile. Possibly a more lofty reason for
special consideration in the taxation of vessels (but often not as practical a reason as the one mentioned above) is the fact that vessels
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce should not be taxed by any
state on the same basis as other property because, unlike real estate
or other property permanently located in the state, vessels so engaged
are usually beyond the physical confines of the state for substantial
periods.
We will first discuss the first problem suggested above.
WHERE

ARE VESSELS REGULARLY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE OR

FOREIGN COMMERCE TAXABLE?

There are eight leading cases in the United States Supreme Court,
extending over almost a ninety-year period from"1855 to 1944, which
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seem to cover most of the situations arising under this first inquiry.
There are a substantial number of decisions of state courts on the subject, but the question being primarily one arising under Federal law,
the state decisions must necessarily bow to these leading cases.'
The first important case to come before the Supreme Court of the
United States involving the subject was Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship. Co., 17 How. 596 (1855). The company in this case sued to
recover personal property taxes paid in California on twelve ships. The
company was a New York corporation whose stockholders were residents and citizens of New York, where it maintained its principal office
and where the company was taxed on its capital.2 All the vessels were
ocean-going craft properly registered in New York. The owner had
an agency in San Francisco and substantial repair facilities in California. It was engaged in the transportation of passengers and freight
between New York and San Francisco via Panama and also to and
from the Oregon Territory. Vessels arrived in San Francisco, discharged, were repaired, refitted, and were ready to leave again generally
in ten or twelve days. Recovery of the taxes were allowed. Considerable stress was laid in the opinion upon the registry of the vessels
in New York. The court, after quoting the laws on registry, said:
"These provisions, and others that might be referred to,
very dearly indicate that the domicile of a vessel that requires to be registered, if we may so speak, or home port, is
the port at which she is registered, and which must be the
nearest to the place where the owner or owners reside. In this
case, therefore, the home port of the vessels of the plaintiffs
was the Port of New York, where they were duly registered
and where all the individual owners are resident, and where
is also the principal place of business of the company; and
where, it is admitted, the capital invested is subject to state,
county, and other local taxes." (Emphasis supplied.)
The court concluded:
"We are satisfied that the State of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they
were not, properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become
incorporated with the other personal property of the state;
they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and
commerce with their situs at the home port, where the vessels belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed
'Following this article is a list of state decisions which illustrate
some of the problems involved in the taxation of vessels and the views
expressed thereon.
2 The reference to the domicile of the stockholders of the corporate
owner in the earlier cases is doubtless due to the question raised as to
whether the state of incorporation of a corporation or the citizenship of its
stockholders governed its citizenship. It was, of course, finally held that
the state of incorporation was conclusive of the question. Ohio & Mississippi R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286 (1862); McLean Oil Co. v. Ashworth,
283 Fed. 422 (1922).
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3
for the capital invested, and where the taxes had been paid."
In St. Loais v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (1871), the City of St. Louis
sued to collect personal property taxes on ferries operated between St.
Louis, Missouri, across the Mississippi River, to a point in Illinois.
The owner of the ferries was an Illinois corporation whose minor officials, real estate and warehouse were located in Illinois, where its ferries -were kept when not in actual use. Stockholders' meetings were
generally held in Illinois, though there were no Illinois stockholders.
The company paid personal property taxes on ferries and other property in Illinois.
The vessels, on the other hand, were enrolled in St. Louis, Missouri.
The principal operating office of the corporate owner was in St. Louis,
Missouri, where its directors, officers and a majority of its stockholders
lived and where the directors' ordinary business meetings were held.
The seal of the company was kept there, the books were kept there,
moneys were collected and received and kept there and some disbursements made from there. By a city ordinance the ferries, could not stay
over ten minutes at the wharf in St. Louis. The court cited the registration laws and said:
"The solution of the question, where her home port is, when
it arises, depends wholly upon the locality of her owners' residence, and not upon the place of her enrollment." (Emphasis
supplied.)
The court denied the right of the city to tax the vessels as the owner
was a resident of Illinois where the home port normally would have
been. The significance of the above quotation given from this case
was apparently not appreciated as the location of the home port irrespective of the domicile of the owner was thereafter often urged as the
sole test of taxability.4

'The vessels of this company on the authority of this case and a later

decision of the United States Supreme Court were held taxable in New
York. The taxation even covered the amount the owner had invested
in vessels then being built for the owner in Delaware. People ex rel. Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Commissioners, 58 N.Y. 242 (1874).
' To understand the reference in the cases here discussed to "registration," "enrollment" and "home port," a short review must be given to the
laws governing these subjects. Vessels are, generally speaking, "registered"
for the foreign trade and "enrolled" for the domestic trade. Badger v.
Guiterez, 111 U. S. 734 (1884). Prior to 1925 this was done in the Collection District which included the port "at or nearest to which the owner,
if there be but one, or if more than one the * * * managing owner * * *
usually resides." REV. STAT. § 4141 (46 U. S. C. 17). The port for this
purpose might be located in a collection district which embraced more
than one state, and such port might be physically located beyond the state
of the owner's residence. REV. STAT. § 2568 (19 U. S. C. 2); The Lotus
No. 2, 26 Fed. 637 (1886).
If the vessel is sold in a district other than the one to which she belongs, a temporary document is issued which is exchanged for a permanent
one when she returns to her own district. Rxv. STAT. § 4159 (46 U. S. C.
29). Registry can be changed to enrollment and vice versa as the trade
of the vessel varies. Permanent or temporary documentation in the new
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In Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 (1873), a tax was laid by the
City of Mobile upon a vessel employed in the coastwise trade between
Mobile and New Orleans. The vessel had been registered in New York
where her owner resided. She was subsequently enrolled as a coaster at
Mobile, where an agent resided who handled the business of the vessel,
such as paying off the crew, etc. The vessel was engaged in the transportation of mail, freight and passengers and was a part of a daily
service. The court emphasized the ownership of the vessel in New York,
stating:
"It was primarily and presumptively taxable under the authority of that State, and of that State only."
The court emphasized that enrollment at Mobile was temporary.5 The
fact that there was no showing that the vessel was taxed in New
York was equally immaterial.
"It is not important. She was liable to taxation there. That
state alone had dominion over her for that purpose."
The court continued:
"It is the opinion of the court that the State of Alabama
had no jurisdiction over this vessel for the purpose of taxation,
for the reason that it had not become incorporated into the
form results, depending upon whether or not the vessel at the time of the
change is at the port to which "she belongs." REV. STAT. § 4323, as amended.
(46 U. S. C. 265).
The law also requires the "home port" to be marked upon the vessel's
stern. REV. STAT. § 4178, as amended. (46 U. S. C. 46). A custom arose
of marking on the stern a "home port" other than an actual port of
entry. This was legalized in 1884 to permit the "home port" to be "where
the vessel is registered or enrolled or the place in the same district where
the vessel was built, or where one or more of the owners resides." Act of
June 26, 1884, 23 STAT. 58 (46 U. S. C. 47). The purpose of this change
was explained in detail in Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S.409.
It will be noted that the "home port" in St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co.,
11 Wall. 423, was properly in St. Louis as the "port" in the collection
district nearest the owner's domicile, but as it was outside the domiciliary
state of Illinois, it was disregarded as a test of taxable situs. So, in other
cases here discussed, enrollment at a certain port was only temporary.
After the passage of the 1884 Act the "home port" and the port of
documentation could be different. It was uncertain at which port the
preferred mortgage created by the 1920 Ship Mortgage Act should be
filed. Act, June 3, 1920, 41 STAT. 1000 (46 U. S. C. 911). Mortgages
were invalidated for failure to comply with the new act and serious losses
were incurred. The Lincoln Land, 295 Fed. 358, 1924 Am. Mar. Cas. 194
(1924); The Susana, 2 F.(2d) 410, 1924 Am. Mar. Cas. 1389 (1924). In the
latter case the court said: "Moreover prior to that Act (Ship Mortgage Act),
there can be no question that the law, literally construed, required the ship
to be registered at the port nearest the residence of the owner and a ship
not registered was not entitled to the status of a vessel of the United
States." (Matter in parenthesis supplied.) The Underwriter, 3 F. (2d) 483,
1925 Am. Mar. Cas. 803 (1925).
This confusion led to the passage of the Home Port Act, February 16,
1925, 46 STAT. 947 (46 U. S. C. 18, 1011-1014). After the passage of the
"Home Port Act", the "home port" and the port of documentation are
always the same and it is fixed by the owner subject to the approval of
the government irrespective of the residence or domicile of the owner.
See BURNHAM, VESSEL DOCUMvENTING AND CONVEYANCING LAW AND THE NEcESsrry OF REVISION, 1925 Am. Mar. Cas. 1.
5Ibid.
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personal property of that state, but was there temporarily
only, and that it was engaged. in lawful commerce between
the states with its situs at the home port of New York where
it belonged and where its owner was liable to be taxed for its
value."
In TransportationCo. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273 (1878), a suit was
instituted to recover personal property taxes paid by a West Virginia
corporation to the City of Wheeling on vessels navigating the Ohio
River between Wheeling and Parkersburg in West Virginia via intermediate places on both sides of the river in Ohio and West Virginia.
The stock of the company was owned partly in Ohio and partly in West
Virginia. The principal office and home port of the vessels were in
Wheeling where the vessels started their voyage and laid up during repairs. The tax was attacked as a duty on tonnage and an improper
burden on interstate commerce. The court held that the tax was a
personal property tax, not a duty on tonnage, and that the vessels were
properly taxed in'West Virginia because they belonged "to a citizen of
the state living within or tributary and subject to her jurisdiction and
protected by her laws. * * *"
In Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (1905),
the steamship company, a Delaware corporation, was engaged in the
transportation of passengers and freight between New York and Norfolk, Virginia, via the Atlantic Ocean. It was the owner of several
sma xesselsand a tug which operated -wholly in Virginia waters. These
were either feeders of passengers and freight to the ocean-going craft
owned -by the company or were used in maneuvering the larger craft.
A personal property tax on these vessels physically located wholly in
the waters of Virginia was upheld despite the fact that they were owned
and enrolled outside the State 6f Virginia. The court pointed out that
it was well settled that property used in interstate commerce was not
exempt from. usual taxation. Concerning the emphasis laid in the Hays
and Morgan cases on the "home port," the court used this rather confusing language:
"It is true by Sec. 4141 there is created what may be called
the home port of the vessel, an artificial situs, which may control the place of taxation in the absence of an actual situs
elsewhere, and to that extent only-do the two cases referred to
go." (Emphasis supplied.)
The court continued:
"Our conclusion is that where vessels, though engaged in
interstate commerce, are employed in such commerce wholly
within the limits of a state, they are subject to taxation in that
state, although they may have been registered or enrolled at a
port outside its limits."
In Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409 (1906), an
Illinois corporation owned small craft conveying ties from various
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states in interstate commerce to Brookport, Illinois, St. Louis, Missouri,
and Duvals Bluff, Arkansas, on the Mississippi and other tributary
rivers. The craft were enrolled "for convenience" at Paducah, Kentucky; when the general manager of the owner resided there. The
principal office of the company was in Chicago, Illinois, though it had
branch offices elsewhere including Kentucky. The craft called occasionally at Paducah for supplies but never to discharge cargo. McCracken County, Kentucky, in which Paducah was located, assessed
and tried to collect personal property taxes on these vessels solely
on the ground that their home port was in that county and state. The
court traced the original documentation act of 1789 and amendments
and concluded that either "actual domicile" of the owner or an
established "permanent situs" elsewhere were the only tests of taxability.
The latter test was illustrated in the preceding case of Old Dominion
S. S. Co. v. Virginia.
It was then urged that § 21 of the Act of June 26, 1884, 23 STAT. 58
(46 U. S. C. 47), which defined the word "port" as meaning
"Either the port where the vessel is registered or enrolled, or
the place in the same district where the vessel was built or
where one or more of the owners reside,"
indicated the intention to permit the owner arbitrarily to fix the
home port of the vessel and thus fixed its place of taxation. The court
discarded this theory and explained that the change made in 1884 was
designed merely to validate a custom which was then prevalent of
placing as the "home port" the name of a locality on the stern of a
vessel, which was not a port of entry. This had been ruled by
government officials to be improper and local pride in small communities resented the limitation upon the selection of a local name.
After the 1884 Act, and until the Home Port Act of 1925, the
"home port" and the port of documentation need not coincide. The
former would be fixed by the owner, the latter was fixed by law as
6
the entry port nearest the residence of the owner.
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911), the
Southern Pacific Company, a Kentucky corporation, operated a number of ships in trade between New York, New Orleans, Galveston,
Cuba, etc. All the ocean-going vessels were enrolled in New York
and that port's name appeared on the stern of the vessels. The vessels
were found to be properly taxed in Kentucky as it was the domicile of
the owner. The court said:
"Since, therefore, an artificial situs for purposes of taxation
is not acquired by enrollment nor by marking of a name upon
the stern, the taxable situs must be that of the domicile of the
owner, since that is the situs assigned to tangibles where an
actual situs has not been acquired elsewhere. *** The persist8
Ibid.
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ence which which this court has declared and enforced the
rule of taxability at the domicile of the owner of vessel property, when it did not appear that the vessel had an actual situs
elsewhere, is illustrated by the cases of (citing the Hays,
Morgan, St. Louis, Old Dominion and Ayer & Lord. Tie Co.
cases) ** * To lay down a principle that vessel property
has no situs for purposes of taxation other than that of permanent location, would introduce elements of uncertainty concerning the situs of such property not presented by other kinds
of movable property." (Emphasis supplied.)
The court thus recognized the difference which should exist between
vessels and the taxation of other personal property: "It is one thing to find that a movable, such as a railway
car, a stock of merchandise, or-a herd of cattle has become a
part of the permanent mass of property in the particular
state, and quite another to attribute to a seagoing ship
and actual situs at any particular port to which it goes for supplies or repairs or for the purpose of taking on or discharging cargo or passengers. A ship is not intended to stay
in port, but to navigate the -seas. Its stay in port is a mere
incident of its voyage, and to determine that it has acquired an actual situs in one port rather than another, would involve
such grave'' uncertainty as to result often in entire escape from
taxation. 1
The court found that the fact that the vessels in question would
never physically enter the State of Kentucky was immaterial.
The foregoing cases establish the following general rules on the
personal property taxation of vessels regularly engaged in interstate
and foreign commerce.
1. A vessel regularly engaged in foreign commerce between ports in
the United States and ports abroad is taxable only in the domicle of
its owner.
2. The same rule applies to vessels regularly engaged in interstate
commerce.
3. An exception is recognized when the vessel is wholly employed
within the limits of the taxing state. If so, then irrespective of ownership and documentation elsewhere, it is taxable by the state.
4. The "home port" of the vessel is immaterial on the question of
tax situs.
5. The fact that a "business domicile" or "business situs" has been
established by the owner of such vessels in a state other than the domicle
of the owners, appears to be immaterial on the subject of their
taxation."
IThe distinction between the taxation of vessels "touching land only

incidentally" and "cars or vehicles" traversing "the land only" has been

long recognized. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Penn., 141 U. S. 18 (1891);
Yost v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 112 Fed. 746 (1901).
8 See also Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co. v. Tallant, 51 F. (2d) 359, 1931 Am.
Mar. Cas. 1351 (1931), where the court held that a Nevada corporation,
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6. Failure or inability of the vessels to enter physically the domicile
of the owner is immaterial on taxation at such domicile.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. V. MINNESOTA, 322 U. S. 292 (1944)
The similarity between vessels and aircraft can be readily seen.
Neither vessels nor aircraft operate on rails, roads, or on any other
land improvement or land structure. Aircraft in a sense have a home
port.' With these similarities in mind, the very recent case of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, cited supra, must be considered to
determine whether the Supreme Court has indicated in its discussion
of the taxation of aircraft any change in its well settled views on the
taxation of vessels. 10
The Supreme Court in this case was called upon to decide under the
Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution whether there was any prohibition against the State of Minnesota laying a personal property
tax on the full value of the entire fleet of the airlines company under the
following statement of facts:
The airlines company was a Minnesota corporation with its principal
place of business in St. Paul where the "home port" of the planes, under
the Civil Aeronautics Authority, was fixed. The planes operated on
daily schedule in seven states extendng from Chicago to the Pacific
Coast. The main repair shop for rebuilding and overhauling the planes
of the company was located in St. Paul, Minnesota, but maintenance
bases were maintained in six cities along the route of the company. All
of the planes during the taxable year had touched the State of Minnesota. All planes were engaged in interstate commerce. Fourteen per cent
of the fixed route of the airlines was located in Minnesota and sixteen
having its business domicile in the State of Washington, was not subject to

personal property taxes on its vessels even though they were documented
in the State of Washington. The court so held irrespective of the fact
that the vessels were not taxed in Nevada, although the court found the
owner had been advised that they were subject to taxation in Nevada.
This taxability of the vessels in Nevada has been subsequently upheld
under similar circumstances in State of Nevada v. United States Lines, 56
Nev. 38, 43 P. (2d) 173 (1936). The rule as to whether a business domicile
creates a situs for taxation under the tax apportionment rule is different as
regards railroad cars. Johnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158 (1933).
A vessel regularly engaged in interstate or foreign commerce does not
establish a tax situs in a state other than that of the domicile of its owner
by a temporary or seasonal ]ayup in such other state. Yost v. Lake Erie
Transportation Co., 112 Fed. 746 (1901); County of Los Angeles v. Olympic
Steamship Co., 1936 Am. Mar. Cas. 434 (1936); County of Los Angeles vs.
Craig, 38 Calif. App. (2d) 58, 100 P. (2d) 818 (1940). See also appended "List
of Representative Cases."
IAct of June 23, 1938, 52 STAT. 1006 (46 U. S. C. 521) provides for
the issuance of a "certificate of registration", which is chiefly concerned
with0 ownership and nationality.
' For a very instructive and entertaining discussion of this case see
Powell, Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota State Taxation of AirplanesHerein also of Ships and Sealing Wax and Railroad Cars, 57 HARv. L. REv.
1097. See also 153 A. L. R. 264, and Jamison, Taxation: State Property
Taxes on Commercial Airlines, 32 CAL. L. REV. 441 (1944).
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per cent of the mileage was flown in Minnesota. The majority of the
court upheld the Minnesota tax.
It is interesting to note that the cases on vessel taxation discussed
above were for the most part all unanimous decisions of the court.
The divergence in the views expressed in the three opinions of the
majority of the court, and the strong dissent of four judges in the
case of the Northwest Airlines must all be carefully considered on the
present subject.
While the case involves the imposition of a personal property tax on
planes, it is highly significant on the question of the imposition of
such taxes on vessels. The line of cases covered above dealing with the
latter subject is discussed in three of the four opinions in the case.
The majority opinion written by Justice Frankfurter and signed
by Justices Douglas and Murphy upholds the Minnesota tax on one
positive and two negative grounds.
The State of Minnesota as the domicile of the owner of the planes
gave it the power "to be" and "to function." Therefore it has
plenary powers of taxation.
The planes in question were not "continuously without the state
during the whole taxable year."
A "defined" portion of the property involved had not acquired "a
permanent location, i.e. taxing situs, elsewhere."
The majority opinion then brushed off the "tax apportionment"
rule urged in the dissenting opinion."
1. It is applicable primarily to taxes imposed by a "non domiciliary"
state.
2. It is a system extended to "old means" of transportation and
communication.
3. It has not been applied in "theory nor in practice" to tax units
visiting only for fractional periods of the year. For example, it
applies only to situations suggesting a continuity somewhat described
as follows:
"Coaches *** daily passing from one end of the state to the
other." (Emphasis supplied.)
"As regards personal property regularly used over fixed routes in
interstate commerce by land carriers, the following cases recognize the
right of a fair apportionment of the value for taxation between the taxing
states: Marye v. B. & 0. R. Co., 127 U. S. 117 (1888); Pullman's Palace Car
Co. v. Penn, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); American Refrigerator Co. v. Hall, 174
U. S. 70 (1899); Union Refrigerator Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149 (1900);
Union Refrigerator Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Germania Refining Co. v. Fuller, 245 U. S. 632 (1917); Union Tank Co. v. Wright, 249
U. S. 275 (1919); Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158 (1933);
Nashville etc. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362 (1940); See also Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Mass, 125 U. S. 530 (1888); Spector Motor Service, Inc., v.
McLaughlin, 139 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 2 1944); Remanded 65 S. Ct. 152.
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4. It is only applicable when "continuous protection by a state
other than the domiciliary State-that is, protection throughout the
taxable year" is furnished. "And permanent means continuously
throughout the year, not a fraction thereof, whether days or weeks."
The majority thus hold that the planes daily flying over and
landing in non-domiciliary states are only there for "fractional periods
of the year," and do not therefore receive the "continuous protection"
throughout the year necessary to invoke the "tax apportionment" rule.
Applying this reasoning to the usual case of vessels engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce it is obvious that they, like aircraft, are
only within a non-domiciliary state for fractional periods of the year
and certainly they do not receive "continuous protection" throughout
the "taxable year." Such vessels under the majority opinion are thus
not subject to the "tax apportionment" rule.
The majority opinion further states that "excusions to foreign
parts" in no way impairs the inherent full taxing power of the
domiciliary state.
The majority opinion strongly emphasizes its dislike of introducing
"tax apportionment" with its "friction, waste, and difficulties" as a
"new doctrine" placing a limitation upon the "hitherto established
taxing power of the home state." It again points out that the "apportionment" rule has been involved in working out the "financial
relations" between states and interstate commerce "conducted on
land" and that it is established in regard to "land commerce."
The emphasis of the majority opinion on the power of the "domiciliary state to tax vessels," is suggestive that the writer of the
majority opinion leans to the rule for the taxation of vessels as being
the proper one to apply to planes, which as indicated above is that
the power of the domiciliary state to tax is exclusive, unless a permanent situs is established elsewhere.12 By abandoning the "tax apportionment" rule it would seem likely for the court, in so far as airplanes are concerned, and in the absence of federal legislation, to adopt
the rule of exclusive taxation by the state of domicile.
The majority opinion, however, purports to leave open the taxation
of the planes by states other than the domiciliary state, saying :
"The taxability of any part of this fleet by any other State
than Minnesota, in view of the taxability of the entire fleet
by that State, is not now before us."
But, in addition to the general trend of the majority opinion, the
following language near the close of the majority opinion would suggest
the view of the writer that the planes in their operation had acquired
no tax situs outside of Minnesota:
12 "Permanent" as used here of course means merely "throughout the
taxable year."
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"* * * But not to subject property that has no locality
other than the state of its owner's domicile to taxation there
would free such floating property from taxation everywhere."'
(Emphasis supplied.)
In any event, the majority opinion appears to accept without question the hitherto established rules on the taxation of vessels discussed
above.
The concurring opinion of Justice Black "would not in this case
foreclose consideration of the taxing rights of states other than Minnesota." He apparently feared the majority opinion was subject to that
construction, which it certainly is.
The concurring opinion of Justice Jackson, on the other hand, declines to accept the majority opinion because "it falls short of commitment that Minnesota's right is exclusive of any similar right elsewhere." He does not give as much weight to the power of the domiciliary state to tax as does the majority opinion. He thinks the "tax
apportionment" rule for land commerce inapplicable to aircraft on
much the same ground that it would seem to be inapplicable to vessels.
On this subject he says:
"Rolling stock is useless without surface rights and continuous structures on every inch of land over which it operates. Surface rights the railroad has to acquire from the
state or under its law. There is a physical basis within the
state for the taxation of rolling stock which is lacking in the
case of airplanes."' 83
His views seem to be influenced by the analogy of the line of cases
holding that "the landing of a ship within the ports of a state for similar purposes did not confer jurisdiction to tax." He leans, however, to
what he terms the "home port" doctrine of the earlier cases involving
vessel taxation.
It is hard to understand the reasoning on this latter point as the
only significance of "home port" even in the earlier cases would seem
to be as tending to show the domicile of the owner, although it must
be admitted that some language in the earlier cases is confusing. To
allow a taxpayer to fix a "home port" without regard to domicile is
now permissible for vessels. This makes the "home port" increasingly
immaterial on the question of taxability. 14
Both concurring opinions suggest the advisability of Congressional
action on the subject.' 5

'8 See supra, n. 7.

The dislike of a court for a rule whereby a taxpayer can by a
"consensual" act create artificial tax results is illustrated in the recent
case5 of Commissioner v. Harmon, 65 S. Ct. 103, decided Nov. 20, 1944.
1 Act, July 3, 1944, c. 398, 58 STAT. 723 was passed to carry out the
recommendations suggested by some members of the 6ourt in this case.
It provides that the Civil Aeronautics Board shall consult with the
appropriate authorities of the various states and other taxing bodies:

"with a view to the development of means for eliminating and
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The dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Stone and signed
by Justices Roberts, Reed and Rutledge, discusses the subject in detail, both under the commerce clause and under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and expresses the view that the tax as upheld by the majority is violative
of the commerce clause of the Constitution. The dissenting opinion
says:
"Obviously interstate business bears no undue part of the
burden if the personal property tax imposed on it by a given
state is-like a tax on real estate located there-exclusive of
all other property taxes imposed by other states, as is the
case with the taxation of vessels * * * or if the tax on its
personal property regularly used over fixed routes in interstate commerce, both within and without the taxing state, is
fairly apportioned to its use within the state, as has until now
been the rule as to railroad cars." (Emphasis supplied.)
The dissenting opinion points out that the majority by not expressly
making the Minnesota tax exclusive may have left the planes subject
to taxation in the states over which they are used in "regular routes"
as the "apportionment tax" cases hold that they establish a situs for
taxation in those states; that in fact the planes are taxed now in six of
the seven states "through which they fly."
Chief Justice Stone emphasizes his view that under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution "physical presence" of tangible property, not the domicile of its owner, is the basis for ordinary tangible
property taxation. The rule is otherwise in the taxation of intangible
property. Under the Fourteenth Amendment he believes that tangible
property is taxable by a state other than the domicile of its owner when
it is physically located in such other state. On the other hand, the
domicile of the owner cannot tax tangible property unless it is physically within its borders. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the writer
of the dissenting opinion feels, the planes "in some measure" are subject "to the taxing power of every state in which they regularly stop
on their interstate mission" if the "tax apportionment" rule applies
as he thinks it should. "Tax apportionment" saves the tax from being
an undue burden under the commerce clause.
The dissenting opinion cites the cases discussed above involving
vessel taxation as not following the "tax apportionment" rule because
the vessels are
"* * * so sporadically and irregularly present in other
states that they acquire no tax situs there * * * and hence

avoiding, as far as practicable, multiple taxation of persons engaged in

air commerce * * * which has the effect of unduly burdening or unduly
impeding the development of air commerce."
The Board is to report to Congress within 180 days after the date of
approval the results of its consultations and its recommendations, including
recommendations for legislation by Congress if that appears necessary or
appropriate.
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remain taxable to their full value by the state of the domicile because they are not taxable elsewhere * * *. But that is
not the case as to any of the planes here involved. And our
decisions establish that, except in the case of tangibles which
have nowhere acquired a tax situs based on physical presence,
and for that reason remain taxable at the domicile even if
never present there, the state's power to tax chattels depends
on their physical presence, and it is neither added to nor subtracted from because the taxing state may or may not happen
to be the state of the owner's domicile."
Parenthetically, it is a little hard to understand how the movement
of the planes of the Northwest Airlines differs materially from the
daily ferries between St. Louis and the shore of Ilhinois involved in
St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., supra, and the daily service between
New Orleans and Mobile involved in Morgan v. Parham,supra. Neither
seem sporadic or irregular.
Again, the dissenting opinion distinguishes the cases involving vessel
taxation in a footnote as follows:
"The rule, generally applied, that vessels are taxable only
by the domicile * * * is no exception to these rules (having
to do with apportionment). For vessels ordinarily move on the
high seas, outside the jurisdiction of any state, and merely
touch briefly at ports within a state. Hence they acquire no
tax situs in any of the states at which they touch port, and are
taxable by the domicile or not at all. But where the vessels
operate wholly within the waters of one state they have been
held to be taxable there, * * * and not at the domicile * * *
a result which like the rule of apportionment in taxing railroad cars, avoids the burden of multiple taxation." (matter in
parenthesis and emphasis supplied.)
The dissenting opinion takes exception to any particular weight
being given in a discussion on the power to tax tangible property
operated, as were the planes here, to "home port," or "business. domicile." "Physical presence" is the proper test for the establishment of
a taxation situs and the dissenting opinion urges that such physical
presence is attained for the taxation of instruments of transportation
by their operation in every state over which a "regular schedule" over
a "fixed route" is maintained. 'The dissenting opinion strongly objects to extending multiple taxation allowed in the case of intangibles
to tangible property such as planes, saying:
"* * * To extend to airplanes moving interstate over fixed
routes on regular schedules, the rule that intangibles may be
taxed at the business domicile whether or not taxed elsewhere;
and to revive the abandoned doctrine that vessels may be
taxed in full at their home port, while rejecting the correlative
rule that they are exempt from taxation elsewhere, is to disregard the teachings of experience and of precedent." (Emphasis supplied.)
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It seems logical to believe that the general rules on vessel taxation
laid down by the seven leading cases discussed above have not been
changed in any respect by this recent case. Three opinions in the case
discussed and accepted as settled the rules of the vessel taxation cases.
"Tax apportionment" has never been applied to vessels. The obvious
distaste of the majority of the court to the extension of the rule of
tax apportionment and the clear recognition of the dissenting opinion
that in the absence of the rule of apportionment, taxation by the state
of domicile must be exclusive, would indicate that the court has no
intention of changing the present rule of taxation of vessels. In any
event it is believe that in the interest of stability the court would wait
for Congress to change the present well settled rules on vessel taxation
if they are to be changed. As Justice Black said, in his concurring
opinion in the case, the court "should enter the field with extreme
caution."
How MUCH SHOULD VESSELS REGULARLY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE
OR FOREIGN COMMERCE BE TAXED?
For some years the three Pacific Coast states have recognized that
personal property taxes imposed by a state on vessels regularly engaged in interstate or foreign commerce must be reasonable to attract
owners to establish their operations on the Pacific Coast. Personal property taxes on such vessels in two of the Pacific Coast states are now
limited to taxes for "state purposes" only and in the third to a fraction of the regular tax. To limit the tax to that levied for "state purposes" or to a fraction of the regular tax is a recognition that vessels
are often out of the state for long periods. It is also a recognition that
when the vessel is in state waters it is often moved from port to port
within the state. The operation of the vessel is a "state" rather than
a county or municipal venture. A tax at the full rate of legal taxation
applied to such a vessel is an injustice. The huge sums involved make
the subject one of paramount importance to a shipowner. The difference between the normal tax rate in many states and the fraction of
the normal rate demanded by the Pacific Coast states, for example,
in the case of a medium-sized freighter will annually involve many
thousands of dollars. The transitory nature of vessels and the comparative ease by which they may escape taxation has often led tax
officials to overlook such property when taxes are levied. In the postwar period vessels will probably not escape taxation so easily and they
should be taxed. A fair tax program seems to be the logical answer.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In San Francisco v. Talbot, 63 Calif. 485 (1883), it was decided
that a vessel registered at Port Townsend in the Territory of Washington, where the "ship's husband" resided, and where the vessel had
been taxed by the Territory, was not taxable in the State of California
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where the vessel only called to receive and discharge cargo. This was
held despite the fact that nine-tenths of the vessel was owned in San
Francisco and only one-tenth was owned in Washington Territory.
Part ownership in California was found not sufficient to make the fill
value of the vessel taxable there. It will be recalled that this is in line
with the rule that where there are several owners the vessel may be
registered at the domicile of the ship's husband as was done in this
case. REv. SAT. 4141 (46 U. S. C. 17).16
In Olson vs. San Francisco, 148 Cal. 80, 82 Pac. 850 (1905), suit
was brought to recover taxes paid under protest on the lumber schooner
"Oliver J. Olsen" for the years 1901-2. The vessel was owned by
several persons, some of whom resided in California and others in the
State of Washington. The vessel was built in the State of Washington and was given temporary registry in that state, her documents
describing the vessel as "of San Francisco." The managing owner of
the vessel lived in San Francisco. The vessel proceeded to Australia
under temporary registration and on March 1, 1901, the taxing date,
had never physically ever been in the State of California. The court
referred to the difference between "temporary"and "permanent" documentation, emphasizing that the latter could only be granted at the
owner's domicile. The California tax on the vessel was upheld as it
was the domicile of the managing owner and under the registry laws
of the United States the permanent port of documentation. The physical absence of the vessel from the state was immaterial as the vessel
had established no permanent situs elsewhere. It was argued in the case
that the vessel might be considered as exempt under certain California
laws. The court, however, stated that such a special statutory exemption of vessels would be unconstitutional.17
To remedy this last situation on November 3, 1913, the voters of the
state adopted the following constitutional amendment:
Article XIIL Sec. 4. "All vessels of,more than fifty (50)
tons burden registered at any port in this State and engaged
in the transportation of freight or passengers, shall be exempt.
from taxation except for State purposes until and including
the 1st day of January, 1935." (Emphasis supplied.)
On November 8, 1932, this constitutional amendment was reen26 In a very early case the right of the State of California to tax
vessels owned and documented in another state, if engaged wholly in
state
waters, was recognized. Minturn v. Hays, 2 Cal. 591 (1851).
17
1 In California Shipping Co. v. County of San Francisco, 150 Cal. 145,
88 Pac. 704 (1907), vessels engaged in interstate and foreign commerce
owned by a California corporation and registered in San Francisco were
held taxable there despite their absence on the assessment date. No
actual situs having been acquired outside the state the fact the vessels
were never physically in the state was immaterial.
In actual practice there has been no levy on such vessels since 1910.
Because of California sales tax revenue there is no present state levy and
no future levy is anticipated although the state retains the right.
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acted by the voters to extend the exemption until January 1, 1955,
which is its present expiration date."'
Other phases of the subject have been likewise considered by the
courts of California. 1"
STATE OF OREGON

The subject of vessel taxation was considered by the courts of the
State of Oregon in Callender Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 61 Ore. 343,
122 Pac. 758 (1912). A Washington corporation owned certain vessels regularly engaged in interstate commerce on the Columbia River
and its tributaries between ports in Washington and Oregon. The articles of incorporation of the company fixed Knappton, Washington, as
the principal place of business and originally the stockholders of the
company lived in Washington. Later the shares of stock of the corporation were sold to Oregon interests and the operation and business office were centered in Astoria, Oregon, where the vessels were documnted as their home port. Astoria in Oregon was the nearest entry port
to the Washington residence of the owner. It was decided that Clatsop County, Oregon, could not tax these vessels as their tax situs was
in Washington, the domicile of the owner, and there only could they
be taxed. 0
Not to be outdone by the 1913 amendment to the California Constitution granting vessels engaged in interstate and foreign commerce
a special tax rate, the State of Oregon on November 7, 1915, amended
Article IX, Section 9, of the Oregon Constitution by a referendum measure reading as follows:
1-b. "All ships and vessels of fifty tons or more capacity
engaged in either passenger or freight coasting or foreign
trade, where home ports of registration are in the State of
Oregon, shall be and are hereby exempted from all taxes of
every kind whatsoever excepting taxes for state purposes until
the first day of January, 1935." (Emphasis supplied.)
See 24 Cal. Jur. § 93.
" Shipowners & Merchants Tug Co. v. City of Los Angeles (Superior
Court, Los Angeles City), 1936 Am. Mar. Cas. 1596 (1936). An undocumented barge always used in Los Angeles Harbor is taxable there.
Dragich v. County of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. App. 397, 86 P. (2d) 669, 1939
Am. Mar. Cas. 853 (1939). Purse seine fishing vessels are not within the
constitutional exemption of vessels as they are not primarily engaged in
"transportation." Followed in Crivello v. San Diego Co., 50 Cal. App.
713, 123 P.(2d) 899 (1942).
County of Los Angeles v. Craig, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 58, 100 P. (2d) 818 (1940).
The exemption of a "registered" vessel under the California Constitution includes an "enrolled" vessel. Kiesig v. San Diego County, 51 Cal.
App. (2d) 47, 124 P. (2d) 163 (1942). The constitutional exemption of vessels of "fifty (50) tons burden" refers to "net registered tonnage."
Sayles v. Los Angeles County, 59 Cal. App. (2d) 295, 138 P. (2d) 768,
1944 Am. Mar. Cas. 110 (1943). Tug owned and documented in Alaska
and time-chartered to California corporation is not taxable in Los
Angeles County when it spends a substantial portion of its time at sea
and in other counties, its tax situs remaining in Alaska.
"

0 See srupra n. 4.
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17.

In 1925 a statute of the State of Oregon made another great concession to owners of ocean-going vessels as follows:
"All ocean-going vessels, whether sail, steam or motor
driven, whose home ports for registration or enrollment are in
the State of Oregon shall be taxed at only one-fiftieth of the
state tax on buildings and improvements on real estate levied
in the same tax year as the tax herein provided for is levied."
(Emphasis supplied.) 21
The present law of Oregon on this subject provides in brief that
vessels of fifty tons and over handling passengers and freight, whose
home ports of registry are in Oregon, shall be taxed ten per cent of the
current consolidated tax levy for all purposes in the district where the
tax is assessed. If such vessels are engaged in the intercoastalor foreign
trade, whether the vessel is actually engaged or is laid up, the tax
is one per cent of the current consolidated tax levy for all purposes of
the district where the tax is assessed.
The law contains a proviso that to and including 1945 the one per
cent tax applies to vessels of fifty tons or more intended for intercoastal or foreign services if such vessels are under construction but
this special tax does not apply on materials used in construction unless
"
in place in the constructed part of any such vessel.22
69-207. Further pro21 Ore. Laws 1925, c. 258, p. 466. OR CODE (1930)
visions on the taxation of vessels were made by Ore. Laws 1935, c. 82, p.
123, and Ore. Laws 1939, c. 491, p. 1013.
22 Ore. Laws 1941, c. 392, p. 669. Unlike the constitutions of the States
of California and Washington, the Constitution of the State of Oregon has
been held to permit special consideratiozi by the legislature of the taxation of vessels. Portland v. Kozer, 108 Ore. 327, 217 Pac.. 833 (1923) ; Corporation of Sisters of Mercy v. Lane County, 123 Ore. 144, 261 Pac. 694
(1927); McPherson v. Fisher, 143 Ore. 615, 23 P. (2d) 913 (1933).
The attorney general of the State of Oregon has had occasion to pass on
the subject on two occasions. On December 4, 1931, he ruled (O's. A'rY
GEx., Oregon, 1930-32, p. 460) as follows:
1. Dredges moving under own power between coastal points within
the state;
2. Dredges towed between coastal points in the state;
3. Power-propelled ocean-going fishing vessels, and
4. Power-propelled tow boats towing between coastal points in
the state;
were all capable of documentation and were- all within- the special tax
provisions of ORE. CODE (1930) §§ 60-207, allowing special taxes on such
vessels irrespective of whether the vessels were actually documented.
Again in 1935 (Ors. ATT'Y GEx., Oregon, 1934-35, p. 515) the-attorney
general considered the following subject:
The ocean-going steamer "Lansing," a floating cannery, owned by
a California corporation and registered in San Francisco, was anchored
for the fishing season of several months duration off North Bend in
Coos County, Oregon. A fleet of small boats were carried with the
vessel which would go over the bar and seine for pilchards which were
then reduced to fish meal and oil in the cannery located aboard the vessel.
Citing several decisions and COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed.) '§ 453, the attorney
general held that the vessel was not subject to taxation in Coos Bay
County, Oregon, because it was not there on: the assessment date nor -had
the vessel established a tax situs in the state of a sufficiently permanent
character.
Clearly influenced by the increase in-floating canneries the 1939 Act

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 20

STATE OF WASHINGTON

The history of the taxation in the State of Washington of vessels
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce follows the coast pattern.
In 1907 the legislature of the State of Washington decided to encourage shipping in the state and passed the following addition to the
tax laws of the state:
"* * * Provided, that the ships or vessels registered in any
custom house of the United States within this state, which
ships or vessels are used exclusively in trade between this
State and any of the islands, districts, territories, states of the
United States, or foreign countries, shall not be listed for the
purpose of or subject to taxation in this State, such vessels not
being deemed property within this state * *

*."

(Emphasis

supplied.) 23
This provision was involved in Pacific Cold Storage v. Pierce County,
85 Wash. 626, 149 Pac. 34 (1915), where a Washington corporation
owned a vessel engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. The vessel
was registered at Tacoma, in Pierce County, Washington. No attempt
had been made to tax the vessel elsewhere. Of course, in the absence
of the exemption statute the vessel was clearly taxable in the State of
Washington under the rules discussed above. The court said:
"This property is owned by a citizen of the State having its
domicile within the state. The place of the owner's domicile
is the registered as well as the home port of the vessel."
A tax by Pierce County on the vessel was upheld on the ground that
the state statute attempting to exempt the vessel from taxation was
unconstitutional as the state constitution did not permit special exemptions or classifications of this character.
In November, 1930, the voters of the State of Washington approved Amendment Fourteen to the State Constitution allowing classification of property. A few months later the legislature adopted the following statute which is now the law of the State:
"Section 1. All ships and vessels whose home ports of registry are in the State of Washington, engaged in interstate
commerce, foreign commerce and/or commerce between the
ports of the State of Washington and the high seas, shall be
and are hereby made exempt from all taxes of every kind
whatsoever, except taxes levied for any state purpose.
"Sec. 2. All ships and vessels under two hundred tons burden, whose home ports of registry are in the State of Washington, shall be and are hereby made exempt from all taxes
of every kind whatsoever, except taxes levied for any state
referred to in note 21, supra, limiting the taxation of vessels contained
elaborate procedure for taxes on reduction or processing plants moored in
state waters.
2

Wash. Laws 1907 c. 48, p. 69.
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purpose and twenty per centum 2 of
4 taxes levied for all other
purposes." (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the present so-called Forty Mill Tax Law of the State of
Washington this law limits the tax on most vessels here under consideration to about two mills. 28 The courts of the State of Washington

2 have considered other phases of the subject.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

It will be observed that the Constitution of the State of California
and the Laws of the States of Oregon and Washington having to do
with special taxes on vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce base the exemption upon the fact that such vessels are documnented within the state. This would appear to be a somewhat unnecessary qualification unless the owner is domiciled in the state, or the
vessels are permanently located in the waters of the state, as other
vessels under present rules normally cannot be taxed there. The reason
for the insistence on documentation within the state is probably a
survival of the so-called "home port" theory, and also an effort to encourage local documentation for advertising purposes, as the state and
its ports necessarily receive some advertising benefit from having vessels in other ports of the United States and the world bearing on their
stems the name of a local port.
While the vessels of a foreign owner generally receive no benefit
from the special tax provisions outlined above, the vessels of a resident
owner, if documented within the state, do receive substantial benefit.
However, by reason of the specific requirement that such vessels be
documented in the state, the owner is prevented from catering to the
local pride of ports in other states at which its vessels may call. For
example, if a California corporation operating in the coastwise trade
between San Francisco, California, and Portland, Oregon, decides that
one of its vessels should have its "home port" in Portland as a recognition of the value of that port in the service of the company, it must
Wash. Laws 1931, c. 81, p. 243.
R v. STAT. § 11238-le. Wash. Laws 1941, c. 176, p. 474. The Forty
Mill Limit was included in the State Constitution as § 2, Art. VII at the
general election on November 7, 1944.
-"Northwest Lumber Co. v. Chehalis, 25 Wash. 95, 64 Pac. 909 (1901)
and North American v. Taylor, 56 Wash. 565, 106 Pac. 162 (1910) recognized
the right of the state to tax the full value of tugs operating solely in
state waters, even though they are owned and documented in another
state. See also McRae v. Bowers Dredging Co. (W. D. Wash.) 90 Fed. 360
(1898). In United States v. King County, 96 Wash. 434, 165 Pac. 70 (1917)
the court went a step further to hold that whaling vessels,, not being
common carriers, by being laid up during the off season in the waters of
the state, thereby establishing taxing situs in the State of Washington
though owned and documented in some other state.
In Petroleum Navigation Co. v. King County, 1 Wn. (2d) 489, 96 P. (2d)
467 (1939), the court -emphasized the general rule which we have pointed
out above that the domicile of the owner controls the taxable situs of
the vessel rather than the home port of the vessel when the latter is not
located at the domicile of the owner.
2

25R z1.
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give up its tax benefit under the California law and it would receive no
benefit from the Oregon law. Thought might be given to removing this
requirement now attached to these special provisions that the vessel
in each instance must be documented in a port in the taxing state.
The laws of the various states in respect to the imposition of personal
property taxes upon vessels regularly engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce show little or no uniformity except on the Pacific Coast.
Provisions run from total exemption from personal property taxes in
Maryland to a full tax in Nevada.2" Between these extremes may be
found the special taxes in New Hampshire and Wisconsin.28 Other
states may do well to consider the constructive tax program in effect
for such vessels on the Pacific Coast.
2,Exemption in the Maryland law from state, county and city direct
taxes is clear and particularly well phrased. The exemption is as follows:
E1943 Supp. AxN. CODE, MD., p. 825, Art. 81 (26)1: "All ships or other vessels,
including aircraft, which are regularly engaged in commerce, in whole or
in part, outside the territorial limits of this state." The taxation of vessels
engaged in foreign trade on the same basis as other personal property in
the state was upheld in State of Nevada v. United States Lines, 56 Nev.
38, 43 P.(2d) 173 (1935).
28 R v. STAT. OF NEv HAMPSHIPE, 1942, c. 73, § 22, p. 298, provide that
ships in the foreign carrying trade for at least ten months of the year
preceding the annual assessment, or built during the year for that trade,
are not included as personal estate but are taxed on "net yearly income."
WIsc. STAT., 1943, § 70-15, provides that vessels in interstate commerce pay a sum equal to one per cent per net ton of registered tonnage
in lieu of other taxes.

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVE CASES
The following list of some of the leading state cases, will illustrate the
various questions presented in the taxation of vessels, and the rulings made
thereon.
National Dredge Co. v. State, 99 Ala. 462, 12 So. 720 (1893). A dredge,
tug boat and scows, for a number of years engaged in a government job
in the state, had acquired thereby a situs for taxation.
Bush v. State, 140 Fla. 277, 191 So. 515, 1940 Am. Mar. Cas. 1034 (1939).
A yacht owned and documented in another state acquired a taxable situs
by seven years physical presence.
Shannon v. Streckfus Steamers, Inc., 279 Ky. 649, 131 S.W.(2d) 833
(1939). The non-resident owner of a vessel, documented outside the state,
still must pay excise taxes for activities conducted on the vessel.
Thompson v. Day, 143 La. 1086, 79 So. 870 (1918). A wrecked vessel
sunk in local waters loses its identity as a vessel and is taxable like other
property.
McFarlandv. Mason, 136 Maine 213, 7 Atl. (2d) 619 (1939). The exception
in the tax laws of Maine for "sailing vessels and barges" does not include
a private yacht with an auxiliary motor.
Hooper v. Mayor, 12 Md. 464 (1859). A vessel registered in a city is
not subjected thereby to city taxes when the owner lives in the county.
Baltimore and Pa. S. S. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 157 Md. 279,
145 Atl. 770, 1929 Am. Mar. Cas. 644 (1929). A vessel plying between
Baltimore and Philadelphia via the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, is engaged in "coastwise commerce" under the then statutory tax exemption
of the State of Maryland.
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Baltimore Steam Packet Co. v. Baltimore, 161 Md. 9, 155 Atl. 158, 1931
Am. Mar Cas. 1229 (1931). A vessel plying between Baltimore and Norfolk is not entitled to such statutory tax exemption because the latter
port is not beyond "Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries" as the statute
requires.
Atlantic Maritime Co. v. City of Gloucester, 228 Mass. 519, 117 N.E.
924 (1917). Fishing vessels, owned in another state, by refitting, etc., in
Massachusetts do not thereby establish a tax situs.
Barker v. Town of Fairhaven, 265 Mass.* 333, 163 N.E. 901 (1928). A
yacht is taxable at the place of the owner's residence.
Graham v. Michigan, 67 Mich. 652, 35 N.W. 808 (1888). Vessels of an
Illinois corporation are not taxable in Michigan where they merely landed
freight and passengers and laid up in the winter.
State v. Haight, 30 N. J. L. 428 (1863). Ferries of a foreign corporation
registered in another state are not taxable merely because they call in
New Jersey in their interstate business.
Tennant v. State (N. J.), 95 N. J. L. 465, 113 Atl. 254 (1921). A tug
owned and registered in New York is not taxable in New Jersey merely
because it is held there temporarily for sale, as it does not thereby acquire a taxable situs away from its owner's domicile.
People ex rel Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Commissioners, 58 N. Y. 242
(1874). Vessels of domestic corporation registered in the state are taxable
though never in the state as are monies invested in vessels being built in
another state.
Commonwealth v. American Dredging 'Co., 122 Pa. 386, 15 Atl. 443
(1888). Capital stock of a local corporation represented by vessels built
and used outside the state is taxable in the state unless vessels are to be
permanently kept beyond the state.
Commonwealth v. Clyde S. S. Co., 268 Pa. 262, 110 At. 532 (1920). The
capital stock of a foreign corporation owning vessels calling in interstate
commerce, while it may not be taxed on the valuation of the vessels, may
be taxed on the amount represented by office furniture, equipment and
loading and .discharging gear, permanently located in the state thus used
in its interstate operations.
. City- of Newport News v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 635, 183 S.E. 514
(1936).. Ferries are taxable at the owner's domicile.
Wisconsin v. Village of Williams Bay, 207 Wis. 265, 240 N.W. 136 (1932).
Winter lay-up for six months on shore creates a taxable situs for small
vessels.
See also "Situs as between different states or countries, of tangible
chattels for purposes of property taxation." 110 A. L. 11. 707.
NoT--Review of decisions of United, States 'Supreme Court since
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 50 L. ed.
150, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905) on situs of personal property for purposes of
taxation, 123 A. L. R. 179. Supplemental notes on same subject 139 A. L. R.
1463, 153 A. L. R. 270.

